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# Septennial Parliaments

VINDICATED.

Humbly Addressed to his Excellency

THE EARL OF *HERTFORD*.

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By ALEXANDER Mc. AULAY, Esq;

One of his Majesty's Counsel at Law, for the Kingdom of IRELAND?

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The SECOND EDITION, with ADDITIONS.

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
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# Septennial Parliaments

## VINDICATED.

**I** HAVE inserted my Name in the Title-Page, to exempt me from the Trouble of replying to anonymous Writers: Declamatory Men, I shall always treat with the same Neglect. I find an Author of that Class hath, under the Mask of Patriotism, lately published a Pamphlet of evil Tendency; alarming many well-meaning People with apprehensions of Dangers, which have no other Existence than in the Author's over-heated Imagination: It may, perhaps, be doubted whether they exist there. Considered as a Declamation, it is by no means a despicable Performance: But the argumentative Part of the Work, if any Thing in it deserves that Name, is unworthy of Notice.

THE



of our second Deliverer. At that Time, Numbers of the *British* Constituents happening to be infatuated by the Nonsense of Jacobitism, it was found advisable to prolong the then Parliament in *Great-Britain*, and to establish septennial Parliaments in that Kingdom; which have ever since been adhered to, there; as the true Medium to guard against Democracy on the one Hand, and Aristocracy on the other.

WHAT is there, then, to distinguish us from *Great-Britain*, in this Respect? Can our Laws, empowering the Government and Council, here, to certify Bills, be urged as a Reason why our Parliaments ought to be of longer Duration than theirs? Or can it be asserted that our People are superior to theirs in Weight and Influence; and that we therefore require longer Parliaments than they do, in order to diminish the Weight of our People; for the Purpose of preserving the like Ballance of Power here, as is preserved there, in the three Estates of the Realm; or that septennial Elections would induce greater Expence among

among us, in proportion to our Fortunes, than is occasioned by such Elections in *Great-Britain*; where the Temptations to Excess in the Expence of Elections are much stronger? Surely Assertions so evidently repugnant to Truth, will not be uttered.

ONE would think, the Example of *Great-Britain* should be decisive, in this Case. We, as a Nation, may properly be considered in a State of Infancy. Our Nativity, as a settled Country of Liberty, cannot be dated higher than the Revolution; perhaps, not quite so high. We have no Experience of our own, that can be much relied on, in any constitutional Matter.

WHAT then are we to do upon Occasions of this Kind? Should not we (the Sons of *Britain*) have recourse to the Experience and Example of our Parent-Country? Should we not, upon every Occasion, entertain the highest Sentiments of Honour and filial Reverence for her Example?

THE Example of *Great-Britain*, in this Particular, does not rest merely upon

on its own Authority; but is supported by the strongest Reasons.

THE House of Commons are the general Inquisitors of the Realm. Inquiring into and redressing Grievances, hath been always considered as a principal Part of their Trust. How this Trust was discharged in unlimited Parliaments is well known. Leaders and their Followers were the Authors of Grievances; and never at a Loss, for a large Majority in such Parliaments.

SOME good Laws were made in the worst Parliaments. Good Laws, which did not interfere with the Schemes of designing Leaders, were as likely to pass in an unlimited as in a limited Parliament: But an effectual Inquiry into any Grievance, was hardly ever known in the former.

IT will not be denied that some Leaders, in former Times, relying on their Strength in an unlimited Parliament, pursued Measures of private Interest, inconsistent with Public Good, injurious to the Crown, and hurtful to the Nation—Screening their Creatures, in  
Frauds

Frauds and Oppressions innumerable---corrupting the Morals of the People, by promoting Luxury, Venality and Prostitution---deceiving their Sovereign, and embezzling the National Treasure, in Pensions to their Favourites and Dependants, that might have been employed in strengthening the Crown and enriching the Kingdom, by nourishing and improving our Infant-Manufactures ---sacrificing the Common Good of King and People to their own Avarice and Ambition---and all this, without Punishment; nay, without the least Check or Controul.

IF it should be our Misfortune to fall again into the Hands of such Leaders; where could Redress be found, or such capital Offenders be brought to Justice? Where, but in a short Parliament?

CHECKING the various Evils of Party, would be a necessary Consequence of septennial Parliaments. Heads of Parties have preserved their Influence, by a prudent Distribution of Places among the Partizans: And when Places *fell short*, in answering Demands; they  
R
supplied

supplied the Deficiency with Pensions. Hence it came to pass, that Places of the most important Public Trust have been often conferred, without much Regard to Propriety or Decency; and Pensions frequently granted, without the least Pretence to public Merit.

ANOTHER well known Evil of Party, worse if possible than the former, was, that it clogged and embarrassed, often ruled Government. A Viceroy, indeed, sometimes attempted to act independant of Party, and to consult the general Good: But the Undertaker generally found Means to convince him of his Mistake.

REFORMING our Popish Natives, would be another happy Effect of septennial Parliaments.

IT can not be doubted, that his Majesty's Protestant Subjects would universally and most heartily concur in every Measure (Persecution excepted) wherein they saw any Tendency to reclaim the Natives of this Kingdom from Popery, Barbarism and Beggary; to make *two Millions* of miserable People (now  
aliened

aliened from their natural Sovereign and attached to a foreign Jurisdiction) good Subjects and happy Men; adding a large Fund of Wealth and Strength to the *British* Empire. I hope to be able to shew, that these would be the certain Effects of septennial Parliaments.

IN Consequence of the Laws made to prevent the Growth of Popery, almost all the Popish Landlords of *Ireland* have conformed: But nothing has yet been done, that hath had any Effect upon the Popish Tenants. The Charter-Schools, indeed, have had considerable Effect in checking the Growth of Popery among the lowest of the People: And yet Popery, upon the whole, is, without doubt, daily gaining Ground throughout the Kingdom.

THIS may, in a great Measure, be accounted for, by the propensity of the Popish Natives to Marriage, the Marriages of Protestants with Papists, the Migrations of Protestants to *America*, the recruiting of the Army by *Irish* Protestants, and the unwearied Assiduity both of the Popish Clergy and Laity in  
gaining

gaining Profelytes. It may, perhaps, be partly owing to some secret Arts, hid from Public View : But whatever be the Cause, the Effect is certain.

'TILL within these few Years, there was scarce a Mass-House to be seen in the Northern Counties of *Ulster* : Now, Mass-Houses are spreading over most Parts of that Country. Convents, till of late, were hid in Corners : Now they are openly avowed in the very Metropolis. From the Revolution 'till a few Years ago, Mass-Houses were little Hutts, in remote and obscure Places : Now they are sumptuous Buildings, in the most public and conspicuous Situations ; as if erected, to brave the Laws and claim Establishment.

IN the last Reign, there was little Attention given in *Ireland* to County-Interests, by the generality of our Landlords ; and, in the present Reign, there will, in all probability, be less ; if Parliaments remain unlimited. Where is the Use of Voices, which have scarce any Chance of living to vote at an Election *in the next Reign* ? But under septennial

nial Parliaments, every Landlord would be solicitous to increase his Influence in County-Elections.

FROM *Ulster*, swarms of Protestants go to *America*, not sufficiently encouraged to settle in the great Pasture-Countries of the other three Provinces. If septennial Parliaments were established here; the Gentlemen of the three Southern Provinces, vying with each other for Numbers of Freeholders to strengthen their County-Interests, would gladly invite all the Redundancies of Northern Protestants: And it is not to be doubted that these would, with equal Gladness, accept of the Invitation.

HERE, it may not be improper to observe, that the lessening of our Exports arising from Pasture is, by no Means, a necessary Consequence of converting our Pasture-Grounds into Tillage. These Exports might, by proper Husbandry, continue the same, perhaps increase, tho' all the Lands in this Kingdom were under Tillage. Good Husbandry unites Tillage with Pasture, and renders them subservient to each other.

In



In so much that Land under Tillage, in the Countries of *England* where Husbandry is well understood, feeds at least as much Cattle as the same Quantity of Land in *Ireland*, of equal Quality and solely dedicated to Pasture.

THE North of *Ireland*, in many Parts, is so crowded; that young People who incline to marry and settle, are often discouraged from pursuing that laudable Intention by the Difficulty they meet with in getting Farms, or even Houses to live in; the Farms and Houses of the Parents being generally too small, to bear a Division. This is the principal Cause of the Migrations to *America*. The young People are under a kind of Necessity to leave this Kingdom, in order to procure Settlements elsewhere: And the Parents frequently chuse to go with them.

THE Attempts to establish Protestant Colonies from *Ulster*, in the Pasture-Countries of the other three Provinces, have hitherto been generally unsuccessful. The Cause of this, is well known. The Colonies hitherto attempted,

ed, were generally too small, to stand their Ground against the Natives. But septennial Parliaments would induce the Gentlemen of those Parts, to transplant Northern Protestants in such Numbers, as would render them quite secure from all Molestation. This would quickly spread the Linen Manufacture throughout the Kingdom; and soon raise us from Poverty to Affluence.

THE Wretchedness of the low People, in the Pasture-Countries of *Munster* and *Connaught*, is really deplorable. The Hovels they live in, would scarce be thought fit for Swine, in a manufacturing Country. Their Cloathing is Rags, utterly insufficient to protect them from the Injuries of the Weather: Indeed, many of them are half-naked. Hunger, Cold, Nastiness, Distress, Famine and Slavery, painted in every Feature of their wretched Visages. What Feelings must every Man have, who hath any Degree of Humanity in his Frame; when he thinks on such Numbers of his Countrymen and Fellow-Subjects, living in such Misery? But, how

how must these Feelings be aggravated, when he considers that those miserable Wretches are formed by Nature, a most amiable People?

IT can not be doubted, that the Wretchedness of those People would be remedied by septennial Parliaments. I never heard that any other Remedy was ever proposed; and I am apt to think that no other, or, at least, none so effectual, can be found. Septennial Parliaments would undoubtedly bring Colonies of Northern Protestants, to mix with them. These Colonies could not fail to introduce Manufactures, Tillage, Industry and Protestantism. And these Changes would soon render those Wretches, comfortable and happy.

POPEERY at present abounds, not only in the Pasture-Countries, but also in the principal Tillage-Counties of this Kingdom; *Kildare, Kilkenny, Wexford, Meath and Louth*. It is universally known that Protestants are inconsiderable, in point of Number, throughout *Leinster, Munster and Connaught*; as well in the Tillage as Pasture-Countries

tries of these Provinces : And many know that Papists, even in *Ulster*, far out-number Protestants. It may, perhaps, seem incredible to Persons unacquainted with the Northern Parts of this Kingdom, that there are large populous Districts in the most Protestant Counties of the North, containing many more Papists than Protestants.

IT is certain, that the Strength of Popery in *Ireland* lies in the Tenantry ; comprehending Manufacturers ; who are generally Farmers, in some Degree. And it can not be doubted, that Landlords in general, under septennial Parliaments, would refuse letting their Lands to Papists ; if Protestant Tenants could any where, by any Means, be found. Even Gentlemen of small Fortunes, who could have no Thoughts of being Candidates for Counties, would nevertheless find it their Interest to be assiduous in enlarging the Number of their Protestant Tenants ; in order to be more serviceable to County-Candidates, who are usually Men of some  
C 2 Influence

Influence and Power, capable of rewarding the Services of their Friends. Hence, the Popish Tenants throughout the Kingdom would, in general, be laid under a Necessity of conforming. Few of them would lose, or even run the Risque of losing their Farms, for the Sake of Religion; Few of them would chuse to be set adrift, without knowing where to go; without any Prospect of getting Farms or Habitations elsewhere. It cannot be doubted, that most of them would chuse to conform, rather than starve. This feigned, extorted Conformity might, after their frequenting the Service of our Church for some length of Time, become Sincere in many of them. At all Events, they would lose much of their Bigotry and Virulence against our Religion: And Landlords, for their own Sakes, would take Care to have the Children educated Protestants; to the End that the Conformity of the Parents might answer the Purpose.

POPISH Landlords, in general, have already conformed; as is before *observed*: And it is not to be doubted, that

that many of them are sincere: Yet it will not be denied, that most of them were at first induced by the Popery-Laws (or, in other Words, by temporal Interest) to inquire into the Principles of the Protestant Religion: But, if temporal Interest hath been the remote Occasion, tho' not the immediate Cause of converting the Landlords; it cannot be doubted that temporal Interest would have a much stronger and more immediate Effect upon the Tenants. In short, I take it to be perfectly clear, that septennial Parliaments would have a most powerful and speedy Effect, in making this Kingdom a Protestant Country throughout.

WHAT a saving of Manufacturers and Husbandmen would thence accrue to *Britain*; by enlarging the Fund for recruiting their Armies? It would give them double Strength, by lessening the Force of their natural Enemies abroad (who now recruit some of their best Troops by *Irish* Papists) and by enabling *Britain*, in Times of War, to draw from hence the Army hitherto necessary

cessary to be kept on Foot here, to secure the Kingdom from disaffected Subjects.

I NEVER heard the Proportion which Papists, in point of Number, bear to Protestants in this Kingdom, estimated at less than five (many think it ten) to one. The Inference is, that for every *Irish* Subject the Crown hath now to rely on, it would, by the Conversion of our Papists, have at least six; perhaps, more than ten. On the lowest Computation, more than two Millions of our People, (now, in Effect, Aliens) would then be rivetted to the Parent-Country, and embarked in one common Interest with her.

GREAT national Evils arise from a Set of Men, common in *Ireland*, who are both Landlords and Tenants, obtaining Leases of considerable Tracts of Land from Gentlemen of Fortune, at moderate Rents; for the Purpose of letting them in small Holdings, at Rack-Rents, to Under-Tenants. This amphibious Species of Men are, in general, extremely detrimental to the common

mon Good. They usually let their Lands to the highest Bidder, without much Regard to the Value; by which Means, Lands in the populous Parts of this Kingdom (where there are not Farms sufficient to answer the Demand) are frequently let at such Rents as the Tenants are scarce able to pay. This totally prevents all Improvements in Husbandry. It is not to be expected that a Tenant who can scarce pay his Rent, will be able to lay out Money in Improvements; or that any Tenant would be at the Expence of Improving his Farm, who lives under continual Apprehensions of being reduced to the Necessity of leaving it.

SEPTENNIAL Parliaments would soon put an End to this great Evil. Gentlemen would then discard these underling-Landlords, and let their Lands to Protestant Farmers, immediate Occupiers of the Ground, at reasonable Rents; to the End that the Tenants might, by improving their Farms, become Freeholders capable of voting. This would, by Degrees, introduce a  
substantial



substantial, Protestant Yeomanry throughout the Kingdom; occupying Farms well improved.

A RIGHT to frequent Parliaments is asserted in the strongest Manner, by the Declaration of Rights made at the Revolution. An *English* Act, made in the First Year of the Reign of King *William* and Queen *Mary*, declares and enacts, That all the Rights asserted in that Declaration are the true, antient and indubitable Rights of that Kingdom: But it was never controverted that the Law of Parliaments is, in all Respects, the same in both Kingdoms; so far as it hath not been altered by Act of Parliament: Nor was it ever alledged, that there is any Act which alters the Law of *Ireland*, in this Particular. Will either Kingdom contradict the Declaration of constitutional Rights, made at the Grand Æra of Liberty?

IT hath, indeed, been said, on former Occasions of this Kind, that *frequent Parliaments*, in the Declaration of Rights and in the Law confirming *it*, mean *frequent Sessions*. But this was  
a Quibble,

a Quibble, invented by some Prostitutes of the long Robe, soon after the Revolution; and hath been always treated with the Contempt it deserves. If this Liberty is to be taken in expounding Laws; to substitute one Word for another, at the Pleasure of the Expounder; it would be vain to make Laws. In common Language, and in the parliamentary Stile throughout, a *Parliament* and a *Session* are as distinct as any two Things can be.

I PRESUME, then, I am well warranted to say, that in asking short Parliaments, we ask no more than *Britain* hath declared our indubitable Right. I hope none of us will ever be inclined to contradict the Sense of that Country, in any Thing; more especially in a Matter of this Consequence, wherein they have declared their Sense, on so great and solemn an Occasion.

WHEN it is considered, that the People of *Ireland* think they have a clear, indubitable Right to frequent Parliaments; and yet have had but two Parliaments in about half a Century

(from 1714 to 1761) it can not be expected that they should be quite free from Murmur and Discontent: Nor is it to be expected, that the Generality of People can ever entertain a due Reverence for the Authority of Human Laws, who think they see the fundamental Laws of their Country perpetually and injuriously violated by their Superiors, in a continual Prolongation of Parliaments. Such a Thought can not but weaken their Sentiments of Justice, and, in some Degree, relax that Spirit of Obedience and Submission to the higher Powers, which the Christian Religion teaches. This must naturally tend to dispose them to Tumult; which often breaks out, among People so disposed, on very slight Occasions; perhaps, on Grievances merely imaginary, and in their Nature frivolous, supposing them to be real.

IT now remains to take some Notice of the Objections to septennial Parliaments. And here I cannot but observe, that altho' several Pamphlets *have been published since the Death*  
of

of his late Majesty, in favour of short Parliaments; not a single Argument, that I have ever heard of, hath yet made its Appearance in Public, on the other Side. This is unaccountable, considering the Importance of the Question; if the Advocates for unlimited Parliaments have any Thing to advance, in Support of their Opinion, which is capable of bearing the Light. But although they have hitherto had the Prudence to conceal their Reasons from public View, and display them only in private Conversations, to captivate and delude the Unwary; many of their Arguments, such as they are, have fallen in my way. I shall mention such of them as seem to deserve any Degree of Notice.

I'T is said, *that a Term of fourteen Years here, is equivalent to Seven in Great-Britain; because they give the same Number of Sessions.* But this, with a little Attention, will appear clearly fallacious. Supposing we had but one Session in seven Years; must we then have a forty-nine-Years-Parliament?

It is the shortness or length of Interval between Elections, that increases or diminishes the Weight of Electors; and is therefore the only Thing to be regarded, in fixing a due Medium for preserving the constitutional Ballance.

IT is further objected, *that the Influence of the Peerage, in the House of Commons, would be much increased by short Parliaments; more than one third of the Commons, as is alledged, being indebted to the Friendship of Lords, for their Seats in that House; and it being evident that these Commoners would, in general, be more inclined to be obsequious to their Lords, in a short Parliament than in a long one.* But this, in my Opinion, affords a strong Argument on the other Side: For, if the Influence of Lords in Elections of the Commons, be so extensive as is alledged in the Objection; the great increase of popular Weight, which must be the Consequence of a septennial Limitation, would render it necessary for many of these Lords to concur in popular Measures; in order *to preserve their Influence in popular*  
Boroughs

Boroughs and Counties. And any additional Weight that such Lords as are absolute Proprietors of Boroughs (if any such there be) might acquire from a septennial Limitation, would be greatly over-ballanced, by the large Increase of Weight which would thence accrue to the People.

IT is further objected, *That septennial Parliaments would make such a Change in our Constitution, as might be attended with many unforeseen Evils—That Innovations of this Kind should be adopted with the utmost Caution—That this Change would abridge the Power of the House, by constraining them to act according to the Opinions of their Constituents, who are incompetent Judges of public Affairs, and usually misled by designing, factious Men—And that these Changes might throw us into Democracy.*

HOW can any Man, with any Degree of Knowledge, either in the Laws or History of *England*, entertain the least Doubt that unlimited Parliaments are a manifest Innovation; and that a proper Limitation would restore, not change

change the Constitution? But supposing this, an Innovation; the Argument proves too much. It might, with equal Strength, have been urged against the Reformation.

IF septennial Parliaments, in *Great-Britain*, had any Tendency to Democracy; could such Danger have escaped Observation there, for such a length of Time? Would not the least Apprehension of so arbitrary, so detestable a Form of Government, have alarmed a People so jealous of their Liberties, into some Attempt for securing their Freedom? But if septennial Parliaments have no such Tendency there; what Reason hath been or can be given, to imagine they would have any such Tendency here?

IT must be allowed, that Persons of Knowledge in Trade and Manufactures may be defective in Knowledge of many other Matters; and that such Persons may, in a particular City or County, be sometimes deluded for a while by a designing, factious Man, a *Mock-Patriot* or MOUNTEBANK-QUACK IN POLITICKS: But it is scarce possible that any such Delusion

Delusion can ever become the general, permanent Sense of the Inhabitants; even of that particular City or County; much less can it ever become the general Voice of the Nation. The general Sense of such a Nation as this, in Matters concerning her internal Interest, may safely be relied on. If Human Nature can admit of Infallibility, it is there to be found.

IT is further objected, *That this Limitation would abridge Prerogative.* For my Part, I am under a particular Tie, as a Servant of the Crown, to support Prerogative: And indeed it cannot be denied that any Abridgement of Prerogative, in these modern Times, ought to be admitted with Caution. But is it to be thence inferred, that we may not safely follow the Example of *Great-Britain*, in any Abridgement of Prerogative, she has thought fit to introduce; or that our following her Example can, in any Degree, impair the constitutional Ballance. But the Truth is, that this Limitation, instead of abridging Prerogative, would in reality enlarge it.

THE



THE *Engliſh* Act of 4th *Edward* III. enacts, That a Parliament ſhall be holden every Year once, or oftener, if need be. This was made a Law of *Ireland* in the 10th of *Henry* VII. as all the other *Engliſh* Acts then were (the local only excepted) and I never heard of any Law that repealed it. If it be not repealed, we have a clear Right to annual Parliaments. The Conſequence is, that a ſeptennial Law would enlarge the Power of the Crown, by enabling it to prolong Parliaments in *Ireland* for ſeven Years ; which, as the Law now ſtands, if the Act of *Edward* III. continues in Force in this Kingdom, cannot legally be prolonged for more than one.

PERHAPS half-thinking Men, as ſuch have done on ſome former Occaſions, may attempt to vilify this antient Statute of *Edward* III. on account of its Antiquity : But ſuch men ought to be informed, that Antiquity is venerable ; the Wiſdom of our Anceſtors, in Matters of Civil Policy, highly reſpectable ; and that length of Time cannot ſanctify an Uſurpation. Were it other-  
wiſe

wife, MAGNA CHARTA could not have survived.

IT is further objected, *That we have hitherto done well, under long Parliaments.* Supposing this just; doth it follow that we would not have done better under short ones?

BESIDES, Times and Measures are daily changing: And these Changes may render this additional Weight, on the Side of the People, more necessary now, to preserve the Ballance, than it was formerly.

SUPPOSE most Commoners of large Fortune and extensive Connexions, called to the House of Lords by Advice of ambitious Leaders—A Number of useless Places, invented by the same Leaders; all to strengthen themselves—The national Treasure, squandered in a boundless profusion of Pensions; by the same Leaders, for the same End—Corruption, universal—The HOUSE, the Property of one or two Men—What would, what must follow? Every Question, every disputed Election, the whole  
E
Business

Business of the Commons, even Money-Grants, would all be settled by a Junto—Majesty itself insulted; the Viceroy dictated to, by the same Junto—One, at least, of the three Estates of the Realm, extinct—But one House of Parliament remaining—The Name, the Form, the Shadow of the other House, perhaps, preserved; the Substance gone—The House (called the House of Commons) composed of Men, not chosen by the People, but by the Junto—Packed Sheriffs—Packed Grand Juries—Packed Petty-Juries—Public Justice perverted—Abuses innumerable—Redress impracticable—The Nation groaning under the complicated Evils of Oligarchy and Aristocracy combined—What Man's Property would then be safe? Is it not wise to guard against such Evils? But how are they to be prevented, or how remedied, otherwise than by a limitation of Parliaments?

IT is further objected, *That septennial Parliaments would render constant Residence of a Viceroy necessary in this Kingdom.*

*Kingdom.* And I cannot but admit that the Diminution, perhaps Extinction of the Power of Leaders, which would soon follow the Introduction of septennial Parliaments, might render it necessary, or, at least, adviseable, for the Viceroy to make this Kingdom his settled Place of Residence: But this is so far from being a Reason against septennial Parliaments, that it is, in my Opinion, a strong Argument in their Favour.

IT is not easy to conceive how a Viceroy, in the Hurry of a Session, can acquire much Knowledge of this Country, from a few Winter-Months-Residence in *Dublin*; especially, when it is considered, that those he may happen to depend on there, may possibly have an Interest in deceiving him: And yet Viceroy's have always been the Persons principally relied on, in *Great-Britain*, for Intelligence concerning this Kingdom. But if *Ireland* were the Viceroy's settled Place of Residence, he might then, at his Leisure, learn with certainty the true State of our Trade, Manufactures and

Agriculture; and might also acquire some competent Knowledge in the real State of Popery throughout the Kingdom. He might then become an Eye-Witness of the extreme Wretchedness of the low People, throughout the greatest Part of this Kingdom; and be enabled, from his own personal Knowledge, to represent many important Facts to his Majesty and the *British* Administration, relative to this Kingdom, which might otherwise seem to them incredible.

IT was never doubted, that the King and Administration desire to make us a rich and flourishing Nation: Nor can it be denied, that the more they know of us, the better they can accomplish this great End: Nor is it to be conceived that the People of *Great-Britain* in general, can be void of Good Will towards their own Offspring. Even abstracting from the Ties of Nature; they cannot but be inclined, for their own Sakes, to promote the Wealth of this Kingdom.

IF the Viceroy this Kingdom is now blessed with, were settled here in a continued

tinued Course of Residence, what Advantages to the Nation, what additional Strength to the Crown, by improving a Country of such Extent, with such Room for Improvement—A Country where the Religion of more than five sixths of its Inhabitants (tho' endowed by Nature with every amiable Quality) renders them disagreeable to the rest of their Fellow-Subjects; and useless, I might say noxious to their King and Country in Times of War: Many of them, Paracide-like, exerting their native Valour, to destroy the Country which gave it Birth; adding such unnatural Force to the Arms of our inveterate Enemy, as was known, in a late War, to turn the Scale in the decisive Battle —A Country, where Men in Power have been known, from Timidity or some baser Motive, to cherish even Popery itself, and discountenance Measures adapted to subdue it—A Country, not half-peopled nor half-employed; scarcely half-civilized—What National Advantages, what additional Force to the Arms

of *Britain*, what new Strength to the *British* Empire, must accrue from the continued Residence of such a Viceroy in such a Country?

IT will scarce be denied, that our Advances in national Improvements have been inconsiderable, compared with what our Country is capable of; and that this Island (altho' a peculiar Favourite of Nature) has hitherto added but little to the Wealth and Strength of *Britain*; compared with what it would have done, in a State of full Improvement. Yet I readily admit, what hath been often observed, that *Ireland*, even in this defective State, is one of the brightest Jewels in the Crown.

EVILS attending popoular Elections, (Animosities, Idleness, Drunkenness, Expence, &c.) are urged as a decisive Argument against septennial Parliaments. But if the Argument, drawn from Evils of this Kind, hath such irresistible Force against a general Election once in seven Years; it must have considerable Weight against the present System of Parliaments  
in

in this Kingdom : For, in a Period of two hundred and twenty-four Years, from the Commencement of the Practice of Prorogation until the Dissolution of our last Parliament (excluding the nineteen Years of *Cromwell's* Usurpation and the Civil War) we have had not less than nineteen Parliaments ; which, upon an Average, gave a general Election once in about eleven Years. And supposing we were never to have more than one general Election in a Reign ; even that would still be liable, in some Degree, to the Objection of Evils attending Elections ; the Disproportion between the Length of a Reign, upon an Average since the Conquest, and a Period of seven Years, being but as about three to one. Hence, one would think that this Argument, if it proves any Thing, proves too much. If any thing can be inferred from it, the true Inference seems to be, that popular Elections ought to be abolished.

POPULAR Elections are the Basis, the very Essence of Liberty. Liberty  
never



never did, nor ever can subsist, in any Country, without them. Evils attending these Elections are inconsiderable, compared with the Miseries of arbitrary Power.

IT must be admitted, that disputed Elections (which hitherto, upon general Elections, have not been very considerable in point of Number) have sometimes occasioned Animosities. But it is a Fact of Notoriety, that Elections contested with the utmost Vigour have been often conducted without much Animosity, when Men of Sense and Temper were the Competitors. Men of another Cast can never pass through Life, without Animosities arising from numberless other Causes : But such Men are seldom any great Objects of Pity.

DISPUTED Elections, no doubt, promote Idleness and Drunkenness in some Degree : Yet I am well informed, the Exports of our Staple-Manufacture increased as usual, in the Year of the last general Election.

MANY greater Occasions of *Idleness*, and more frequent Occasions of *Drunken-*

Drunkenness, are passed over without much Observation—Unlawful Horse-Races, Cock-Fights, Hurling-Matches, Fairs, superstitious Holidays, &c.

THE Expence of frequent Elections hath, in the neighbouring Kingdom, been Matter of Complaint in some private Families; but not an Object of Public Attention. There is little expended in that Manner, but in the Produce of the Country; and it is all expended at Home 'Tis true, when this Expence grows excessive, it becomes a Vice; and, like other expensive Vices too prevalent among Gentlemen of Fortune, it may, in some Degree, contribute to impair their Estates, and perhaps reduce some of them to the Necessity of selling: But a Circulation of landed Property is, by no Means, repugnant to the Policy of a trading Nation.

SOME Evils, no doubt, there are, attending popular Elections: But the most perfect System, the wisest Institution that ever was, or ever can be fram-

ed, must, from the Vices and Infirmities of human Nature, be liable to this Objection. Religion itself sometimes degenerates into Superstition and Enthusiasm; and Libertines have urged these, as an Argument against it. But the true Question, in all Cases of this Kind, is, whether the Advantages or Disadvantages preponderate.

WHATEVER Arts may be practised in Private, for the Purposes of Deception; I can scarce think that any Man will stand forth in Public and deny, that the national Advantages which would undoubtedly accrue from septennial Parliaments, far out-weigh all the Disadvantages that can possibly be apprehended from the Frequency of Elections; and that all the Evils which the warmest Imaginations ever did or can, with any Colour, impute to septennial Elections, aggravated to the utmost, are quite inconsiderable, when compared with those which necessarily result from unlimited Parliaments, and evidently appear

appear to be utterly irremediable, otherwise than by a proper Limitation.

IN a Word; if constitutional Freedom, Redress of Grievances, Public Oeconomy, Industry, Husbandry, Manufactures, Wealth, Population, Subordination, Loyalty and Protestantism be national Benefits; and if Oligarchy, Faction, Oppression, capital Offenders superior to controul, universal Corruption, open Contempt of the Laws, Lawgivers and Courts of Justice, endless Misapplication of Public Money, Pensions boundless, Prostitution shameless, Grievances innumerable without Redress, Sloth, Idleness, Beggary, Barbarism, Devastation, Discontent, Tumult, Disaffection and Popery be national Evils; the Bill now depending, intended for a septennial Limitation of Parliaments in this Kingdom, ought to pass into a Law.

*F I N I S.*

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